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ARE DISCLOSURES REALLY STANDARDIZED?
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
URI BENOLIEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
A major goal of federal disclosure laws is to ensure that pre-contractualdisclosure documents, in each industry, are standardized.1  Disclosure
standardization has the potential to produce several important social ben-
efits.  To begin with, standardized disclosures may help disclosees make
effective “apples-to-apples” comparisons between competing products and
services.2  The ability to conduct effective comparisons enables disclosees
* Faculty of Law, College of Law & Business.  J.S.D., U.C. Berkeley; LL.M.,
Columbia University.  I am grateful to Oren Bar-Gill, Rupert Barkoff, Lisa
Bernstein, Christopher Drahozal, Alon Harel, Gideon Parchomovsky, Renana
Peres, Ariel Porat, Arie Reichel, Eyal Zamir, and Tal Zarsky for invaluable
comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. See, e.g., Truth in Savings Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4301 (2012) (“It is the purpose of
this chapter [12 U.S.C. §§ 4301 et seq.] to require the clear and uniform disclosure
of [ ] (1) the rates of interest which are payable on deposit accounts by depository
institutions; and (2) the fees that are assessable against deposit accounts . . . .”
(emphasis added)); Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-583, 102 Stat. 2960 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1610–1646 (2012)) (“An Act
[t]o provide for more detailed and uniform disclosure by credit and charge card
issuers . . . .” (emphasis added)); Statement of Basis and Purpose Relating to Dis-
closure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business Op-
portunity Ventures, 43 Fed. Reg. 59,621, 59,638 (Dec. 21, 1978) (“[B]y establishing
a uniform, minimal set of required information, disclosure requirements enhance
the efficiency of markets . . . .” (emphasis added)).  Similarly, in 2009, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued amendments to Form N-1A, the regis-
tration form used by mutual funds, in order to enhance the disclosures that are
provided to mutual fund investors.  The amendments require key information “to
appear . . . in a standardized order.” See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Enhanced
Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered Open-end Management Invest-
ment Companies, https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/33-8998-secg.htm [https:/
/perma.cc/XNP2-HYVF] (last updated Feb. 24, 2009).
2. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 303 (1991); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A
Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1032 (2000) (citing Uri Geiger, Harmo-
nization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global Market—A Proposal, 66 FORDHAM L.
(1)
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to choose a product or service more easily “with the best combination of
price [and] features [ ] to meet their individual needs.”3  In addition, dis-
closure standardization has the potential to reduce the reading and learn-
ing costs for disclosees and third-party intermediaries by enabling them to
read and learn a basic structure of a single, uniform disclosure format,
rather than multiple diverse formats.4  Standardized disclosures may thus
assist third-party intermediaries to “establish easy-to-use mechanisms,” with
which disclosees could “compare data quickly across several different [dis-
closers].”5  Examples of such tools include comparison-shopping websites
and mobile applications designed to assist people in comparing between
REV. 1785, 1795 (1998)); Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L.
REV. 916, 950 (1998); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclo-
sure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 700 (1984); Geiger, supra, at
1795; Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 723 (1997); George
Loewenstein et al., Disclosure: Psychology Changes Everything, 6 ANN. REV. ECON. 391,
406 (2014); William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and
American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1741 (1999) (citing Charles P. Kin-
dleberger, Standards as Public, Collective and Private Goods, 36 KYKLOS 377, 378, 384
(1983)); Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Trans-
parency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394, 404–05 (2014);
Steven L. Schwarcz, The Use and Abuse of Special-Purpose Entities in Public Finance, 97
MINN. L. REV. 369, 397 (2012); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Informa-
tion in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69
VA. L. REV. 1387, 1460 (1983); Note, Consumer Protection and Payment Systems: Regu-
latory Policy for the Technological Era, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1870, 1889 (1985); Memoran-
dum from Cass R. Sunstein, Admin., Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Heads
of Executive Departments & Agencies 5 (Sept. 8, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/informing-consumers-through-
smart-disclosure.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6YN-Q5ZB].
3. See Businessperson’s Guide to Federal Warranty Law, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/businesspersons-guide-
federal-warranty-law [https://perma.cc/G6JU-7DKS] (last updated May 2015);
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, STATE OF CONN., DEP’T OF CONSUMER PROT., http://
ct.gov/dcp/cwp/view.asp?a=1629&q=431058 [https://perma.cc/9HD9-VLF4]
(last updated Apr. 6, 2010, 12:08 PM); see also Zachary E. Davies, Comment, Rescu-
ing the Rescued: Stemming the Tide of Foreclosure Rescue Scams in Washington, 31 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 353, 374 (2008).
4. See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 1032 (“Investors and managers only need
[to] learn how to deal with a single set of disclosure standards . . . .  Individual
firms, however, may lack incentives to develop or comply with such standards.”);
Kurt Eggert, Truth in Gaming: Toward Consumer Protection in the Gambling Industry, 63
MD. L. REV. 217, 263 (2004); Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions Are Not
Enough: The Significance of Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for
Mandatory Securities Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223, 288 n.137; Geiger,
supra note 2, at 1795; Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 2, at 1460.
5. See Stephen J. Choi, Assessing Regulatory Responses to Securities Market Global-
ization, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 613, 632 (2001); see also Choi, supra note 2, at
950; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 5; Natali Helberger, Forms Matter: Informing Consum-
ers Effectively, BEUC 34 (Sept. 2013), http://www.beuc.eu/publications/x2013_0
89_upa_form_matters_september_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/UDU7-AN5N];
OFCOM, A Review of Consumer Information Remedies 3, 40 (Mar. 12, 2013), https://
www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0033/91698/information-remedies.
pdf [https://perma.cc/G3UP-HSNB].
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various providers of services and goods.6  By facilitating comparison shop-
ping, standardization has the potential to increase competition among dis-
closers hoping to attract well-informed disclosees.7
Given both the federal government’s goal of ensuring that disclosure
documents are standardized and the multiple potential social benefits of
disclosure standardization, an important question arises: are disclosure
documents, in reality, standardized?  To my knowledge, there has been no
empirical research-based examination of this question to date.  The pur-
pose of this Article is to address this research gap.  This article examines,
as a case study, a collection of 109 financial performance disclosures, pro-
vided by franchisors to prospective franchisees, in the quick service restau-
rant industry.8
The quick service franchise industry plays a dominant role in the U.S.
economy.  It has approximately 157,000 franchise establishments;9 em-
ploys approximately 3,340,000 employees;10 and has a yearly nominal out-
put of approximately of $233 billion.11  This industry is governed by a
federal disclosure law known as the Franchise Rule (Rule).12  The Rule
was enacted by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),13 an agency that
aims, inter alia, to “enhance informed consumer choice.”14  The Rule re-
quires each franchisor, in each industry, to provide potential franchisees
6. See, for example, CreditCards.com, for a website that compares credit
cards’ key factors such as interest rates, annual fees, and other important features.
7. See 12 U.S.C. § 4301(a) (2012) (“The Congress hereby finds that . . . com-
petition between depository institutions would be improved . . . if there was uni-
formity in the disclosure of terms and conditions on which interest is paid and fees
are assessed in connection with such accounts.”); Labeling and Advertising of
Home Insulation: Trade Regulation Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 31258, 31270 (May 31,
2005) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 460) (citing comment submitted by Insula-
tion Contractors Association of America (ICAA) arguing that consumers’ compari-
son between various home insulation standardized disclosures will “enhance
competition in the market”); Jason Ross Penzer, Note, Grading the Report Card: Les-
sons from Cognitive Psychology, Marketing, and the Law of Information Disclosure for Qual-
ity Assessment in Health Care Reform, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 207, 248 (1995) (citing
George S. Day & William K. Brandt, Consumer Research and the Evaluation of Informa-
tion Disclosure Requirements: The Case of Truth in Lending, 1 J. CONSUMER RES. 21,
21–32 (1974)).
8. See infra Part III.
9. See IHS ECONOMICS, Franchise Business Economic Outlook for 2015 15 (2015),
http://emarket.franchise.org/FranchiseBizOutlook2015.pdf [hereinafter Outlook
for 2015].
10. See id. at 17.
11. See id. at 18.  “Nominal output is the gross value of goods and services
produced—a concept that is comparable with ‘sales’ for most industries.” Id. at 5
n.4.
12. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 436–437 (2016).
13. The Rule “went into effect on October 21, 1979” and was amended in
2007. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, Franchise Rule Compliance Guide i (May 2008), https:/
/www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/bus70-franchise-rule-com
pliance-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC4M-YXEC].
14. See About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc
[https://perma.cc/AL6G-6H3D] (last visited Jan. 12, 2017).
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with a franchise disclosure document (FDD) “containing . . . information
about the offered franchise, its officers, and other franchisees.”15  The
FDD, the subject of this Article’s empirical analysis, is intended to allow
potential franchisees “to weigh the [expected] risks and benefits” of the
offered franchise before making a purchasing decision.16
This Article is structured as follows: Part II will provide context by
reviewing the federal government’s efforts to ensure that disclosure docu-
ments are standardized.  Part III will present data and discuss the method-
ology for empirically testing whether disclosure documents in the quick
service restaurant franchise industry are standardized.  Part IV will discuss
normative implications of the empirical results.
II. THE FEDERAL GOAL OF STANDARDIZATION
A. Disclosure Laws
A major goal of federal disclosure laws is to ensure that disclosure
documents, in each industry, are standardized.17  Through standardization,
disclosure laws aim to assist disclosees in making effective comparisons be-
tween competing products and services, thereby increasing competition
among disclosers hoping to attract well-informed disclosees.18
15. See Franchise Rule, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/enforce-
ment/rules/rulemaking-regulatory-reform-proceedings/franchise-rule [https://
perma.cc/W765-X4AF] (last visited Jan. 12, 2017); see also 16 C.F.R. §§ 436.2(a),
436.5.
16. See Franchise Rule, supra note 15.
17. See supra note 1.
18. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA), Pub. L. No. 90-321,
§ 102, 82 Stat. 146, 146 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2012)) (“It is the
purpose of this title to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the
consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms . . . .”);
Truth in Savings (Regulation DD), 12 C.F.R. § 1030.1(b) (2016) (“This part re-
quires depository institutions to provide disclosures so that consumers can make
meaningful comparisons among depository institutions.”); Agency Information
Collection Activities, 79 Fed. Reg. 41,284, 41,284 (July 15, 2014) [hereinafter
Agency Information] (“The Franchise Rule ensures that consumers who are con-
sidering a franchise investment have access to the material information they need
to make an informed investment decision provided in a format that facilitates com-
parisons of different franchise offerings.”); Energy and Water Use Labeling for
Consumer Products Under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (Energy Label-
ing Rule), 78 Fed. Reg. 43,974, 43,974 (July 23, 2013) [hereinafter Energy Label-
ing Rule] (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 305) (“The Rule requires energy labeling
for major home appliances and other consumer products, to help consumers com-
pare competing models.”); Disclosure of Mutual Fund After-Tax Returns, 66 Fed.
Reg. 9002, 9014 (Feb. 5, 2001) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, and
274) (“[I]nvestors would not be able to easily compare each fund when making an
investment decision if there were no uniform disclosure standards for after-tax per-
formance information applicable to all funds.”); Businessperson’s Guide to Federal
Warranty Law, supra note 3 (“Congress wanted to ensure that consumers could
compare warranty coverage before buying.”); OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFF.,
Trade Regulation Rule Concerning the Labeling and Advertising of Home Insula-
tion, REGINFO.GOV (Spring 2015), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgenda
ViewRule?pubId=201504&RIN=3084-AB40 [https://perma.cc/F6CF-N9T8] (“The
4
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For example, a central goal of the Franchise Rule is to ensure that
franchise disclosure documents are standardized.  As the FTC’s Coordina-
tor of the Franchise Rule, Craig Tregillus, stated: “The Franchise Rule is
designed to ensure that prospective franchisees receive the information
they need to make an informed investment decision, and to make that
information available in a uniform format that facilitates comparison shopping
among different franchise offerings.”19
In order to achieve the goal of disclosure standardization, the
Franchise Rule requires that an FDD, provided by each franchisor, uni-
formly include the same 23 prescribed items.20  For example, item three
focuses on the disclosure of litigation involving the franchisor.21  Item 7,
as another example, concerns the disclosure of the franchisee’s
“[e]stimated initial investment[s],” such as “[t]he initial franchise fee” and
“[t]raining expenses.”22  Item ten, as another illustration, deals with dis-
closure of the financing arrangement that the franchisor offers to the fran-
chisee.23  In addition, a central item, item 19, the focus of the empirical
test of this article,24 concerns the disclosure of the financial performance
of franchise outlets.25
Another example of a disclosure law that aims to standardize disclo-
sure documents is the Truth in Savings Act (TISA).26  TISA requires de-
Rule is designed to assist consumers in evaluating and comparing the thermal per-
formance characteristics of competing home insulation products . . . .”); see also
Truth in Savings Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4301(a) (2012) (“The Congress hereby finds that
. . . competition between depository institutions would be improved . . . if there was
uniformity in the disclosure of terms and conditions on which interest is paid and
fees are assessed in connection with such accounts.”); 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (2012)
(“In order to . . . improve competition in the marketing of consumer products, any
warrantor warranting a consumer product to a consumer . . . shall . . . disclose in
simple and readily understood language the terms and conditions of such
warranty.”).
19. See Don Sniegowski, An Interview with the FTC About the New Franchise Rule,
BLUE MAUMAU (June 2, 2008, 11:59 AM), http://www.bluemaumau.org/5648/
an_interview_with_ftc_about_new_franchise_rule [https://perma.cc/V4GY-
9GMF] (emphasis added); see also Agency Information, 79 Fed. Reg. at 41,284
(“The Franchise Rule ensures that consumers who are considering a franchise in-
vestment have access to the material information they need to make an informed
investment decision provided in a format that facilitates comparisons of different
franchise offerings.”); Statement of Basis and Purpose Relating to Disclosure Re-
quirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity
Ventures, 43 Fed. Reg. 59,621, 59,638 (Dec. 21, 1978) (“[B]y establishing a uni-
form, minimal set of required information, disclosure requirements enhance the
efficiency of markets by facilitating comparison of competing franchise
offerings.”).
20. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 436.5(a)–(w) (2016).
21. See id. § 436.5(c).
22. See, e.g., id. § 436.5(g)(1)(i)(A)–(B).
23. See id. § 436.5(j).
24. See infra Part III.
25. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(s).  For more information about item 19, see infra
Part II.B.
26. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4313 (2012).
5
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pository institutions to disclose “the rates of interest which are payable on
deposit accounts by depository institutions[ ] and the fees that are assessa-
ble against deposit accounts.”27  A central underlying goal of the Act is to
standardize the terms and conditions of depository institutions’ disclo-
sure.28  Accordingly, Regulation DD, which implements TISA,29 requires
that each disclosure document uniformly includes seven prescribed items,
which incorporate detailed data about the account’s interest rate and
fees.30  By requiring a uniform disclosure of seven prescribed items, TISA
aims to allow consumers to “make a meaningful comparison between the
competing claims of depository institutions with regard to deposit ac-
counts.”31  Through promoting effective comparison shopping, the TISA
aims to increase competition among depository institutions hoping to at-
tract well-informed consumers.32
Likewise, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act33 requires “any warrantor
warranting a consumer product . . . by means of a written warranty” to
disclose uniformly nine prescribed items that embody the central terms
and conditions of the warranty.34  By standardizing the disclosure format,
this Act aims to “ensure consumers could compare warranty coverage
before [purchasing a product].”35  The Act’s central purpose is to “im-
prove competition in the marketing of consumer products” by facilitating
the consumers’ ability to compare products efficiently.36
Other prominent examples of federal disclosure laws that aim to pro-
mote consumer-comparison shopping through standardized disclosures
include the FTC’s Rule Concerning the Labeling and Advertising of
Home Insulation,37 the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) dis-
27. Id. §§ 4301(b)(1)–(2).
28. See id. § 4301.
29. See 12 C.F.R. § 1030.1 (2016) (“This part, known as Regulation DD, is is-
sued by the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection to implement the Truth in
Savings Act . . . .”).
30. See id. § 1030.4(b).
31. See 12 U.S.C. § 4301(b).
32. See id. § 4301(a); see also Understanding the Effects of Certain Deposit Regula-
tions on Financial Institutions’ Operations, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Nov.
2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201311_cfpb_report_findings-relative-
costs.pdf [https://perma.cc/S38T-M4KY] (“Many consumer financial protection
regulations require disclosures that facilitate informed product choice and com-
parison shopping and that reduce consumer search costs.”).
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2012).
34. See id. § 2302(a); 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a) (2016).
35. See Businessperson’s Guide to Federal Warranty Law, supra note 3; Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act, supra note 3 (“[T]he law ensures that consumers get an oppor-
tunity to compare warranty coverage before buying.”).
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a).
37. 16 C.F.R. § 460.12; OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFF., supra note 18.
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closure rule of Mutual Fund After-Tax Returns,38 the FTC’s Energy Label-
ing Rule,39 and the Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act.40
B. The Smart Disclosure Policy
The federal goal of standardizing disclosure documents is reflected
not only in existing disclosure laws, but also in the federal “smart disclo-
sure” policy.41  In 2011, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA), “a well-established institution within the Executive Office of the
President,”42 issued an important memorandum for the heads of execu-
tive departments and agencies.43  “The purpose of this memorandum
[was] to set out guidance for agencies to inform and facilitate the use of
disclosures . . . .”44  Agencies were instructed to “give careful consideration
to whether and how best to promote smart disclosure.”45  According to the
memorandum, “the term ‘smart disclosure’ refers to the “timely release of
complex information and data in standardized . . . formats in ways that en-
able consumers to make informed decisions.”46  The memorandum also
38. See Disclosure of Mutual Fund After-Tax Returns, 66 Fed. Reg. 9002 (Feb.
5, 2001) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, and 274).
39. 16 C.F.R. § 305.11(a); Energy Labeling Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 43,974,
43,974–44,011 (July 23, 2013) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 305).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2012) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure
. . . disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare . . .
various [credit] terms . . . .”); Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-583, 102 Stat. 2960 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1610–1646 (2012))
(setting forth “[a]n Act to provide for more detailed and uniform disclosure by
credit and charge card issuers”).
41. The term “smart disclosure” refers, inter alia, to the release of information
in a standardized format “in ways that enable consumers to make informed
decisions.” See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 2, 5.  For a further discussion of resources
relating to federal smart disclosure policy, see Federal Smart Disclosure Resources,
DATA.GOV, https://www.data.gov/consumer/smart-disclosure-policy-resources
[https://perma.cc/D5K6-PCEZ] (last visited Jan. 13, 2016).  For academic litera-
ture on the term smart disclosure, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF
GOVERNMENT 98–99 (2013); Oren Bar-Gill, Defending (Smart) Disclosure: A Comment
on More Than You Wanted to Know, 11 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 75, 75 (2015);
Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122
YALE L.J. 574, 580 (2012); Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default
Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1472 (2014); Karen Brad-
shaw Schulz, Information Flooding, 48 IND. L. REV. 755, 781 (2015); Richard H. Tha-
ler & Will Tucker, Smarter Information, Smarter Consumers, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Jan.–Feb. 2013, at 44, 49–50, https://hbr.org/2013/01/smarter-information-
smarter-consumers [https://perma.cc/C563-9ERR]; Djoko Sigit Sayogo, Ctr. for
Tech. in Gov’t, & Theresa A. Pardo, Ctr. for Tech. in Gov’t, Understanding Smart
Data Disclosure Policy Success: The Case of Green Button, Proceedings of the 14th
Annual International Conference on Digital Government Research 72 (2013).
42. Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and
Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1838 (2013).
43. See Sunstein, supra note 2.
44. Id. at 2.
45. Id.
46. Id. (emphasis added).
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instructed federal agencies that standardization of disclosures should be
implemented “[t]o the extent feasible and appropriate . . . in a way that
promotes useful comparisons.”47  Agencies were instructed further to
“consider mechanisms to combat [disclosers’] attempts to evade stan-
dards” through means such as “categorizing [fees] under misleading head-
ings” or other “attempts to conceal” fees.48
In the same vein, the National Science and Technology Council
(NSTC), an organization chaired by the President,49 established the “Task
Force on Smart Disclosure” (Task Force) in 2011.50  The purpose of the
Task Force was to “recommend approaches that [f]ederal entities can take
to facilitate the ‘smart disclosure’ of data about consumer markets.”51  In
May 2013, the Task Force published a report, which provided important
“recommendations for expanding the use of smart disclosure and promot-
ing effective smart disclosure policies across the [f]ederal
[g]overnment.”52  The recommendations included that (1) “agencies
should incorporate smart disclosure into all . . . policymaking related
to . . . consumer issues” and (2) a governmental “forum for agencies to
share smart disclosure strategies and tools” should be established.53
Given the federal goal of disclosure standardization, as reflected by
disclosure laws and the smart disclosure policy, an important question
arises as to whether disclosure documents are, in reality, standardized.
The purpose of the next Part of this Article is to address this question by
empirically examining, as a case study, a collection of financial perform-
ance disclosures in the quick service restaurant franchise industry.
47. Id. at 5.
48. See id.
49. See OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY, National Science and Technology Council,
WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ostp/nstc [htt
ps://perma.cc/SSL3-W9LM] (last visited Dec. 28, 2016).  “A primary objective of
the NSTC is the establishment of clear national goals for Federal science and tech-
nology investments in a broad array of areas spanning virtually all the mission areas
of the executive branch.” Id.
50. See COMM. ON TECH., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, Task Force on Smart
Disclosure: Information and Efficiency in Consumer Markets 1, https://www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/tfsd_charter_signed.pdf [https://perma.
cc/H3T7-Y4RC] (last visited Jan. 13, 2016).
51. Id.
52. See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, Smart Disclosure and Consumer Decision
Making: Report of the Task Force on Smart Disclosure (May 30, 2013), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/report_of_the_task_force_on
_smart_disclosure.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4TX-8LPA].
53. See id. at 30–31.
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III. THE EMPIRICAL TEST: ARE FRANCHISE DISCLOSURES STANDARDIZED?
A. The Quick Service Restaurant Franchise Industry
The franchising business model plays a vital role in the U.S. economy.
It includes around 780,000 establishments.54  These establishments, in
turn, provide approximately 8.8 million jobs.55  Furthermore, they annu-
ally produce goods and services worth about $890 billion and contribute
approximately $500 billion to the GDP.56
This Article focuses on a sub-sector of the business model of franchis-
ing, the quick service restaurant industry.  A quick service restaurant is
defined as an “establishment[ ] primarily engaged in providing foodser-
vice where patrons generally order or select items and pay before eat-
ing.”57  Typical examples of quick service restaurants “[i]nclude limited-
service eating places, cafeterias, fast-food restaurants, beverage bars, ice
cream parlors, pizza-delivery establishments, carryout sandwich shops, and
carryout service shops with on-premises baking of donuts, cookies, and ba-
gels.”58  Famous examples of quick service restaurants include Subway,59
McDonald’s,60 and KFC.61
The quick service restaurant franchise industry is the focus of this pa-
per for two central reasons.  First, this industry consistently leads among
all other franchise industries in a number of important categories.62  To
begin, the quick service restaurant franchise industry regularly has the
highest share of franchise establishments, which stands at around “20% of
all franchise establishments” today.63  In addition, the industry frequently
has the highest share of employees, which currently comprises around
38% of all franchise employees.64  Finally, this industry consistently has
54. See Outlook for 2015, supra note 9, at 2.  “An establishment is a single physi-
cal location at which business is conducted or services or industrial operations are
performed . . . .  An establishment may be owned by the franchisor or the fran-
chisee.” Id. at 5 n.2.
55. See id. at 2.
56. See id.
57. NAT’L RESTAURANT ASSOC., FOUNDATIONS OF RESTAURANT MANAGEMENT &
CULINARY ARTS: LEVEL ONE 8 tbl.1.1 (2011).
58. See Outlook for 2015, supra note 9, at 23.
59. See 2015 Top Franchises from Entrepreneur’s Franchise 500 List, ENTREPRE-
NEUR, https://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/500/2015/ [https://perma.cc/
BA2V-L8CP] (last visited Jan. 14, 2017) [hereinafter Franchise 500].
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. Other franchise industries include automotive, business services, commer-
cial and residential services, lodging, personal services, and real estate.  See Outlook
for 2015, supra note 9, at 5.
63. See id. at 15, 19.
64. See id. at 17, 19.
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the largest share of nominal output among all franchise industries; its out-
put has been estimated to comprise 26% of total output.65
This Article focuses on only a single franchise industry, namely the
quick service industry, for a second reason.  By using a single industry, this
study controlled for industry-specific disclosure characteristics.  The type
of financial information contained in a franchise disclosure document
may vary by industry.66  For example, franchisors in the lodging industry
prepare financial performance disclosures based on industry indicators of
success, “such as average room rates . . . average occupancy percentage
and ‘RevPar’ (revenues per available room).”67  In the quick service res-
taurant industry, however, financial performance disclosures are often
based on indicators such as monthly or annual dollar sales volume or
profit.68
65. See id. at 18, 19.  Specifically, “[t]his business line [was] expected to con-
tribute 26% of total output in 2015.” Id. at 19.
66. See Stuart Hershman & Joyce G. Mazero, Historical Development of Earnings
Claims (Now Financial Performance Representations) Regulations, in FINANCIAL PERFORM-
ANCE REPRESENTATIONS 1, 16–17 (Stuart Hershman & Joyce Mazero eds., 2008)
(“[I]ndustries involved in franchising vary widely and one form of disclosure (e.g.,
gross sales) might not be relevant or applicable to all industries (e.g., the lodging
industry, which is concerned with occupancy rates).”); Debra M. Bollinger, S.D.
Div. of Sec., et al., Earnings Claims—The Disclosure Most Franchisors Do Not
Want to Make—And a Report from NASAA, Presentation at the International
Franchise Association’s 29th Annual Legal Symposium, 8 (May 1996) (“[The]
[t]ype of information useful to a franchisee varies by industry.”); Brian B. Schnell,
Faegre & Benson LLP, et al., Financial Performance Representations—Shield or
Sword?, Presentation at the American Bar Association’s 31st Annual Forum on
Franchising 33 (Oct. 2008) (“The type of financial information contained in a
financial performance representation varies by industry.”).
67. See Gary R. Batenhorst, Cline Williams Wright Johnson & Oldfather, LLP,
& Charles S. Modell, Larkin Hoffman Daly & Lindgren Ltd., Tips, Techniques and
Traps for Drafting and Using Financial Performance Representations, Presenta-
tion at the American Bar Association’s 35th Annual Forum on Franchising 16
(Oct. 2012); see also Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning
Franchising and Business Opportunities, 72 Fed. Reg. 15,444, 15,456 n.97 (Mar.
30, 2007); Hershman & Mazero, supra note 66, at 13; Rupert M. Barkoff et al., How
to Prepare, Read, and Use a Financial Performance Representation, in FINANCIAL PERFORM-
ANCE REPRESENTATIONS 69, 76 (Stuart Hershman & Joyce Mazero eds., 2008); F.
Joseph Dunn et al., FisherZucker, LLC, Beyond Gross Sales: Creative Approaches
to Earnings Claims, Presentation at the International Franchise Association’s 40th
Annual Legal Symposium 11 (May, 2014); Stuart Hershman, DLA Piper Rudnick
Gary Cary, & Marc P. Seidler, Seidler & McErlean, Earnings Claims—A Practi-
tioner’s Approach, Presentation at the International Franchise Association’s 38th
Annual Legal Symposium 6 (May 2005); H. Bret Lowell, Brownstein Zeidman and
Lore, & Leonard N. Swartz, Arthur Andersen LLP, Preparing and Reviewing Earn-
ings Claims, Presentation at the American Bar Association Forum on Franchising
10-11 (Oct. 1995); Schnell et al., supra note 66, at 33.
68. See Schnell et el., supra note at 66, at 31, 47; Andrew A. Caffey, The Impor-
tance of Item 19 in the Franchise Disclosure Document, ALL BUS., http://www.allbusiness
.com/the-importance-of-item-19-in-the-franchise-disclosure-document-13425632-1.
html [https://perma.cc/A9EG-RZEM].
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B. Methodology
In order to ascertain the level of standardization among financial per-
formance disclosures in the quick service restaurant industry, this study
took four steps. First, the author located, via the 2015 Entrepreneur maga-
zine’s dataset,69 a list of 179 quick service restaurant franchisors.70  It
should be noted that previous studies have estimated that the Entrepre-
neur’s annual datasets capture, on average, around a third to a half of all
franchisors.71  Importantly, some studies have also estimated that Entrepre-
neur datasets are representative “of the population of . . . franchisors oper-
ating in the United States.”72  Therefore, Entrepreneur datasets are widely
used as a source of data for empirical legal research on franchising.73
Second, the author excluded from the list of the 179 quick service
franchisors thirty-six new franchisors that began franchising after 2010.
69. See Franchise 500, supra note 59.
70. The entire dataset covers 927 franchisors from various industries, of which
179 are quick service franchisors. See Franchise 500, supra note 59; 2016 Top
Franchises from Entrepreneur’s Franchise 500 List, ENTREPRENEUR, https://
www.entrepreneur.com/franchise500 [https://perma.cc/Q3Z3-L44W] (last vis-
ited Dec. 29, 2016) (located under “Understanding the Rankings”).  Notably, since
1980, Entrepreneur Magazine has published the annual dataset of North American
franchisors, known also as “The Annual Franchise 500.” See ,e.g., John E. Clarkin &
Robert B. Hasbrouck, The Franchise 500*reg; As a Research Tool: How Objective and
Reliable Is It?, 14 J. SMALL BUS. & ENTER. DEV. 144, 144–45 (2007).  Each annual
dataset includes, inter alia, the following facts: how long a franchisor has been in
business, how long the franchisor has been franchising, how many units are owned
by the franchisor, how many units are owned by franchisees, and what are the total
startup costs needed to open a franchise. See ,e.g., Franchise 500, supra note 59.
71. See Francine Lafontaine, A Critical Appraisal of Data Sources on Franchising, 4
J. MKTG. CHANNELS 5, 20 (1995); Scott Shane & Maw-Der Foo, New Firm Survival:
Institutional Explanations for New Franchisor Mortality, 45 MGMT. SCI. 142, 146 (1999)
(noting “[Entrepeneur’s] list includes only information from firms which choose to
respond to the survey”); see also Scott Shane et al., The Effects of New Franchisor
Partnering Strategies on Franchise System Size, 52 MGMT. SCI 773, 778 (2006) (“Accord-
ing to previous researchers, the Entrepreneur Magazine records capture most
franchise systems.” (citing Francine LaFontaine, Contractual Agreements as Signaling
Devices: Evidence from Franchising, 9 J.L., ECON. ORG. 256 (1993))).
72. See Shane & Foo, supra note 71, at 146 (“Entrepreneur Magazine’s list is rep-
resentative of the population of business format franchisors operating in the
United States.”); see also Shane et al., supra note 71, at 778.
73. See, e.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Contract and Jurisdictional
Freedom, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 325, 344 (F.H. Buckley
ed., 1999); Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 695, 723–24; Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of
Litigation and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549,
562 (2003) (citing 1999 version of Franchise 500 list); Christopher R. Drahozal &
Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure: Carve-Outs from Arbitration Clauses, 66
FLA. L. REV. 1945, 1979–80 (2014) (citing 1999 and 2011 versions of Franchise 500
list); Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight from Arbitra-
tion?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 90 (2008) (citing 1999 version of Franchise 500 list);
Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration Clauses? The Use of
Arbitration Clauses After Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. 955, 988 (2014).
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These new franchisors have relatively few franchisee-owned units.74
Therefore, these franchisors may find it difficult, as opposed to older
franchisors, to disclose meaningful information about their units’ finan-
cial performance to potential franchisees.75
Third, for each of the remaining 143 franchisors, attempts were made
to locate its publicly-available 2015 FDD, via three major FDDs governmen-
tal databases76: the Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions,77 the
Minnesota Department of Commerce,78 and the California Department of
Business Oversight.79  Through these databases, this study located the
FDDs of 109 quick service restaurant franchisors.  These franchisors serve
as the final sample of this empirical study and are listed in Appendix I.
Fourth, among all the FDDs of the franchisors in the sample, the au-
thor compared a disclosure item, entitled “Item 19: Financial Performance
Representations” (Item 19).  It should be noted that, under Item 19, each
franchisor is entitled, according to the Franchise Rule, “to provide infor-
mation about the actual or potential financial performance of its
franchised [or] franchisor-owned outlets.”80  The purpose of Item 19 is to
assist prospective franchisees in assessing the potential profitability of the
franchise they may open.81
74. Each of the new thirty-six franchisors has, on average, about eleven fran-
chisee-owned units.  Conversely, each of the remaining 143 franchisors has, on
average, 1,227 franchisee-owned units. See Schnell et al., supra note 66, at 36 (“New
franchisors will not have any franchisee information to include in a FPR . . . .”).
75. See Leslie D. Curran, Plave Koch PLC, et al., Current Hot Topics in
Franchise Registration and Disclosure, Presentation at the International Franchise
Association’s 47th Annual Legal Symposium 1 (May 2014) (“But complying with
the FTC Rule’s disclosure requirements for an FPR may be complicated, time con-
suming, and a bit tricky for new and start-up franchisors who do not have a long
operational history of large source of financial data from which to pull.”); see also
Bollinger et al., supra note 66, at 7 (“Start up franchisors do not have sufficient
history/information.”); Hershman & Seidler, supra note 67, at 7 (“[I]n new or
small franchise systems, franchisors often do not have sufficient data to compile a
meaningful earnings claim.”); Lowell & Swartz, supra note 67, at 15 (“[S]tart up
franchisors may lack the data to provide [earning] claims.”).
76. For a brief comparison between these three databases, see Tom Pitegoff,
How to Get Free Franchise Disclosure Documents, FRANCHISE ALCHEMY (Sept. 22, 2014),
http://franchisealchemy.com/how-to-get-free-fdds/ [https://perma.cc/Z89P-B9T
6].
77. See Franchising, STATE OF WIS., DEP’T OF FIN. INST., https://www.wdfi.org/fi
/securities/franchise/ [https://perma.cc/2JCU-LT9F] (last visited Jan. 15, 2016).
78. See CARDS, MINN. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, https://www.cards.commerce
.state.mn.us/CARDS/security/search.do?method=ShowSearchParameters&search
Type=new [https://perma.cc/6YXX-HXS8] (last visited Jan. 15, 2016).
79. See California Electronic Access to Securities and Franchise Information, CAL.
DEP’T OF BUS. OVERSIGHT, http://www.dbo.ca.gov/CalEASI/CalEASI.asp [https://
perma.cc/CGM6-Q3TU] (last visited Jan. 15, 2016).
80. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(s) (2016).
81. See Marisa D. Faunce, Plave Koch PLC, & Jan S. Gilbert, Haynes and
Boone, LLP, Weighing the Risks and Benefits of Financial Performance Represen-
tations, Presentation at the International Franchise Association’s 45th Annual Le-
gal Symposium 1 (May. 2012) (“Prospective franchisees often request this
12
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Out of the twenty-three disclosure items contained in each FDD, this
study focuses solely on Item 19 as a comparative benchmark for two cen-
tral reasons.82  To begin, comparing each of the 23 FDD items across all
109 disclosure documents in the sample would be too complex and time-
consuming a task.  Each FDD, including its 23 disclosure items, is gener-
ally more than 150 pages long, and many exceed 350 pages in length.83  In
addition, the financial performance disclosure provided under Item 19 is
one of the most significant pieces of information for prospective franchis-
ees.84  “Most franchisees buy a franchise either as the start of a new career
or as an investment opportunity.”85  Unsurprisingly therefore, one of pro-
information in order to develop their business plans and to assess the potential
profitability of the franchise.”); W. Michael Garner, W. Michael Garner, P.A., &
Earsa R. Jackson, Strasburger & Price, LLP, Litigating Unlawful FPR’s and Practical
Tips for Doing So, Presentation at the American Bar Association’s 33rd Annual
Forum on Franchising 14 (Oct. 2010) (“The goal of an FPR is to assist a prospec-
tive franchisee with making an informed decision regarding purchase of the
franchise.”).
82. The FDD’s 23 items are regulated in 16 C.F.R. §§ 436.5(a)–(w).
83. See The Most Important Parts of the Franchise Disclosure Document, BUS. OPPOR-
TUNITIES (May 13, 2015), http://www.business-opportunities.biz/2015/05/13/im
portant-parts-franchise-disclosure-document/ [https://perma.cc/QBP8-FSVE];
Redazione, What to Consider When Buying Your Franchise, AZ FRANCHISING (Oct. 30,
2014), http://www.azfranchising.com/what-to-consider-when-buying-your-fr
anchise/ [https://perma.cc/8RLX-AN4N]; see also FDD Structure?, FRANCHISE DIS-
CLOSURES, http://www.franchisedisclosures.com/fdd-structure/ [https://perma.
cc/4VTN-YDAE] (last visited Jan. 15, 2016); Joel Libava, 4 Reasons Why You Need to
Hire a Franchise Attorney, ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.entrepre
neur.com/article/228432 [https://perma.cc/VS4B-5VBM].
84. See Hershman & Mazero, supra note 66, at 12 (“The franchise investment’s
potential financial performance is the critical piece of information for any sensible
investor.”); Hershman & Seidler, supra note 68, at 5 (“[T]he franchise investment’s
potential financial performance is the critical piece of information for any sensible
investor.”); David L. Cahn & Will K. Woods, Item 19 Earnings Claims—A Disclosure
Most Franchisors Should Try to Make, 20 FRANCHISE L.J. 122, 124 (2001) (stating Item
19 “provides the information that every sensible person wants when deciding
whether to purchase a franchise”); Thirty Years of Franchising, 27 FRANCHISE L.J. 85,
100 (2007) (“[E]arnings information [in Item 19] is not only critical to an in-
formed investment decision but also the single most important piece of informa-
tion that prospective franchisees need to make a truly informed purchasing
decision.”); Dale Cantone, Md. Att’y Gen. Office, et al., Mandatory Earnings
Claims—What, When and How?, Presentation at the International Franchise Asso-
ciation’s 31st Annual Legal Symposium 15 (May 1998) (“State franchise regulators,
franchisees, and franchisee representatives . . . believe that earnings information is
the most material information prospective franchisees need to make an informed
investment decision.”); Lowell & Swartz, supra note 67, at 15 (stating “[o]ne of the
most important disclosures for a franchisee is an earnings claim”); Schnell et al.,
supra note 66, at 2 (“For prospective franchisees, financial performance informa-
tion often is critical . . . .”); Don Sniegowski, The Elusive Earnings Claims, BLUE
MAUMAU (Sept. 8, 2009, 5:42 PM), http://www.bluemaumau.org/7899/elusive
_earnings_claim [https://perma.cc/3GKC-AA5G] (“[A] track record of financial
results . . . is the [ ] most vital item of information a potential investor needs to
have.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Susan Kezios, President of
American Franchisee Association)).
85. Cahn & Woods, supra note 84, at 124.
13
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spective franchisees’ most basic and frequent questions is “how much can I
reasonably expect to earn if I buy the franchise?”86  Item 19 deals with this
important question.
C. Data
Tables 1 and 2 show, by percentage, some basic characteristics of the
franchisors in the sample.  Table 1 summarizes the products offered by the
franchisors studied.  Those products are varied.  The most common type
of product studied is sandwiches.  The sample, however, does include
other products, such as pizza, frozen desserts, baked goods, hamburgers,
chicken, Mexican food, and smoothies.
TABLE 1 PRODUCTS PROVIDED
Sandwiches 16.51%
Pizza 15.6%
Frozen Deserts 15.6%
Baked Goods 11.01%
Hamburgers 7.34%
Chicken 7.34%
Mexican Food 6.42%
Smoothies 5.5%
Coffee 4.59%
Miscellaneous Products 10.09%
86. See Peter C. Lagarias, How to Attack a Financial Performance Representation, in
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE REPRESENTATIONS 101, 102 (Stuart Hershman & Joyce
Mazero eds., 2008) (“Prospective franchisees universally want to know ‘How much
will I make?’”); Rupert M. Barkoff, Kilpatrick & Cody, & Andrew C. Selden, Briggs
and Morgan, P.A., Thou Shalt Disclose Earnings Information! NASAA’s Final Fron-
tier—Where No Regulator Has Gone Before, Presentation at the American Bar
Association’s Forum on Franchising 1 (Oct. 1994) (“The question always asked by
a prospective franchisee is how much can he or she expect to earn as a result of the
franchise acquisition.”); Batenhorst & Modell, supra note 67, at 32; Garner & Jack-
son, supra note 81, at 47 (“On the mind of every prospective franchise is ‘How
much money can I make?’”); Faunce & Gilbert, supra note 81, at 1 (“[O]ne of the
first questions a franchise seller will field from a prospective franchisee is ‘How
much money can I earn if I buy your franchise?’” (footnote omitted)); Rick Bisio,
How Much Will I Make with a Franchise? (Item 19 of the FDD), FRANCHISE GATOR (Apr.
17, 2014, 3:20 PM), https://www.franchisegator.com/articles/how-much-money-
fdd-item-19-11779/ [https://perma.cc/2Y7Y-AM2X] (“At the core of every poten-
tial Franchisee is the age-old question: How much money can I make?”); Mark C.
Siebert, Should Franchisors Use Financial Performance Representations in the Franchise
Sales Process?, FRANCHISE CHAT, http://www.franchise-chat.com/resources/sh
ould_franchisors_use_financial_performance_representations.htm (last visited
Jan. 15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/PV6P-TX8Z] (“[T]he single most frequently
asked question in franchising is ‘How much can I make?’”).
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss1/1
2017] ARE DISCLOSURES REALLY STANDARDIZED? 15
Table 2 summarizes the year in which the franchisor began franchis-
ing.  It illustrates that the franchisors studied are normally long-standing,
well-established franchisors.  Most franchisors have been franchising for
more than twenty-three years.  The newest franchisors in the sample are
Orange Leaf Frozen Yogurt, Fuzzy’s Taco Shop, and Fresh Healthy Cafe´,
which began franchising in 2009.  The oldest franchisor in the sample is
Dairy Queen, which began franchising in 1944.  The 1990s and the 2000s
were the most common decades for the franchisors in the sample to begin
franchising, with 27.52% of franchisors each, followed by the 1980s with
22.94% and the 1970s with 8.26%.
TABLE 2 YEAR BEGAN FRANCHISING
2000s 27.52%
1990s 27.52%
1980s 22.94%
1970s 8.26%
1960s 5.5%
1950s 4.59%
1940s 3.67%
D. Results
The empirical results of this study show that the financial perform-
ance disclosures in the quick service restaurant industry are far from being
standardized.  To begin with, the disclosures are not standardized in terms
of the existence of any financial performance data.  While 82.57% of dis-
closures provide some information about the financial performance of the
franchise units, 17.43% of disclosures explicitly state that they do not pro-
vide any financial performance information whatsoever.
More importantly, among the majority of disclosures that do provide
some financial performance information, at least five major variations ex-
ist. First, while 72.22% disclosures include some data about the units’ sales
and costs, 27.78% of disclosures include data about only the units’ sales.
This variation is important for prospective franchisees.  Disclosures that
address only the units’ sales and neglect to address their costs usually fail
to “yield [meaningful information] on profitability.”87
Second, while 75.56% of disclosures include distinguished data about
the financial performance of units which are owned by franchisees, 24.44%
of disclosures do not include such data.  These latter disclosures either
mix between the performance of franchisee-owned units and franchisor-
owned units or provide data about only franchisor-owned units.  This vari-
87. See Lowell & Swartz, supra note 66, at 10; see also David J. Kaufmann,
Mandatory Earnings Claim Disclosure: The Case Against, 15 FRANCHISE L.J. 3, 6 (1995)
(“Learning about average unit gross sales tells one nothing about average unit
profitability . . . .”).
15
Benoliel: Are Disclosures Really Standardized?  An Empirical Analysis
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017
16 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62: p. 1
ation between disclosures that include distinguished data about franchis-
ees and those that do not is significant for potential franchisees because
there are numerous prototypical differences between the financial per-
formance of franchisee-owned and franchisor-owned units.88  First,
“franchisor-owned units may not pay royalties” to the franchisor, while
franchisee-owned units do.89  Moreover, franchisors, as opposed to fran-
chisees, “may benefit from volume discounts” when purchasing goods or
services made available to them due to their operation of multiple loca-
tions.90  In addition, “[franchisor-owned] units may have a much larger
territory in which to operate than what a franchisee will be offered” by
their franchisors.91  Furthermore, “[t]he franchisor may be more skilled
and experienced at controlling costs and increasing revenues than the
franchisee,”92 and franchisor-owned units may count in their revenue In-
ternet sales or other sources of revenue that a franchisee “may be re-
stricted from pursuing” by their franchisor.93
Third, the disclosures differ in terms of the characteristics of the units
that are included.  While 2.22% of disclosures explicitly include co-
branded units, 10% of disclosures explicitly exclude those units.  Moreo-
ver, while 5.56% of disclosures explicitly include units who had multiple
owners during their performance, 7.78% of disclosures explicitly exclude
such units.  Furthermore, 17.78% of disclosures exclude units that are lo-
cated in certain types of locations, such as train stations and airports, while
others do not.  In addition, 21.11% of disclosures exclude certain types of
units, such as express restaurants or kiosks.  However, others do not.  Addi-
tionally, 11.11% of disclosures exclude units at certain geographic loca-
tions in U.S. territories, while others do not.  These disclosures also vary
88. See Hershman & Seidler, supra note 67, at 34 (“There may be differences
in the data between franchised and company-owned businesses.”).
89. See Cantone et al., supra note 84, at 11; Lowell & Swartz, supra note 67, at
11; Curran et al., supra note 75, at 12–13.
90. See Curran et al., supra note 75, at 13; see also Cantone et al., supra note 84,
at 11; Hershman & Seidler, supra note 67, at 34; Lowell & Swartz, supra note 66, at
11.  Relatedly, a franchisor may have a line of credit with “a lower interest rate than
the rate available to franchisee.” See Curran et al., supra note 75, at 14.
91. Curran et al., supra note 75, at 13.
92. Hershman & Seidler, supra note 67, at 34.
93. See Curran et al., supra note 75, at 13.
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among themselves, and exclude different locations, such as Florida,94 Ha-
waii,95 Alaska,96 Puerto Rico,97 or regions with less than ten units.98
The disclosures differ in terms of the characteristics of the units in
several other ways.  For example, they are non-standardized regarding the
length of the period in which the units performed.  Eighty percent of dis-
closures explicitly state that they include information about units operated
for a minimum of one year.  However, 16.67% of disclosures explicitly
state that they include data about units who operated for a minimum pe-
riod other than a year.  These disclosures also vary among themselves, and
include minimum operating periods for their units ranging from twenty-
six weeks to four years.99
Relatedly, the disclosures are non-standardized in terms of the end
date of their fiscal year.  In 51.11% of disclosures, the ending date of the
94. See, e.g., Disclosure of Hungry Howie’s Pizza & Subs (2016), at 45.
95. See, e.g., Disclosure of Jack in the Box (2016), at 50.
96. See, e.g., Franchise Disclosure Document of Baskin-Robbins 83, https://
www.wdfi.org/apps/FranchiseSearch/details.aspx?id=612971&hash=886520883&
search=external&type=GENERAL [https://perma.cc/KZ4S-5F37] (last visited Jan.
15, 2017) (available under “Download”).
97. See, e.g., Franchise Disclosure Document of Church’s Chicken 45, https://
www.wdfi.org/apps/FranchiseSearch/details.aspx?id=613605&hash=299615039&
search=external&type=GENERAL [https://perma.cc/NRU4-SZF4] (last visited
Jan. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Church’s Chicken FDD] (available under “Download”).
98. See, e.g., Franchise Disclosure Document of Dunkin’ Donuts 97, https://
www.wdfi.org/apps/FranchiseSearch/details.aspx?id=612972&hash=444191223&
search=external&type=GENERAL [https://perma.cc/MQY7-FETP] (last visited
Jan. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Dunkin’ Donuts FDD] (available under “Download”).
99. See, e.g., Franchise Disclosure Document of Biggby Coffee 38, https://
www.wdfi.org/apps/FranchiseSearch/details.aspx?id=613456&hash=1855425324&
search=external&type=GENERAL [https://perma.cc/KR59-YYSX] (last visited Jan.
15, 2017) (available under “Download”) (thirteen months); Church’s Chicken
FDD, supra note 97, at 45 (twenty-six weeks); Franchise Disclosure Document of
Jet’s Pizza 33, https://www.wdfi.org/apps/FranchiseSearch/details.aspx?id=613
314&hash=821479910&search=external&type=GENERAL [https://perma.cc/
J9KA-QYUJ] (last visited Jan. 15, 2017) (available under “Download”) (four years);
Franchise Disclosure Document of Krispy Kreme Doughnuts 55, https://www.wdfi.
org/apps/FranchiseSearch/details.aspx?id=613660&hash=1010957114&search=ex
ternal&type=GENERAL [https://perma.cc/5MLF-G9JU] (last visited Jan. 15,
2017) [hereinafter Krispy Kreme FDD] (available under “Download”) (eighteen
months); Franchise Disclosure Document of Menchie’s 37, https://www.wdfi.org/
apps/FranchiseSearch/details.aspx?id=613226&hash=462757169&search=external
&type=GENERAL [https://perma.cc/P2HA-UFLK] (last visited Jan. 15, 2017)
(available under “Download”) (fifty-three weeks); Franchise Disclosure Document
of Moe’s Southwest Grill 54, https://www.wdfi.org/apps/FranchiseSearch/details.
aspx?id=612919&hash=1655665146&search=external&type=GENERAL [https://
perma.cc/GD95-P4A2] (last visited Jan. 15, 2017) (available under “Download”)
(three years); Franchise Disclosure Document of Orange Leaf Frozen Yogurt 40,
https://www.wdfi.org/apps/FranchiseSearch/details.aspx?id=613291&hash=3042
61745&search=external&type=GENERAL [https://perma.cc/U5SW-57J6] (last vis-
ited Jan. 15, 2017) (available under “Download”) (360 days); Franchise Disclosure
Document of Toppers Pizza 49, https://docqnet.dbo.ca.gov/search/Share
pointDocuments/ [ ] (last visited Jan. 15, 2017) (available under “Franchise Dis-
closure Document”) (two years).
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franchisor’s fiscal year is identical to the end date of the calendar year,
namely, December 31.  However, other disclosures include a different end
date.  The latter disclosures also vary and include different end dates rang-
ing from January 31 to October 25.100  Comparing financial performance
disclosures among franchisors with varying fiscal-year periods can be diffi-
cult for prospective franchisees,101 in that the dynamic economic condi-
tions that exist in each fiscal year, such as inflation, recession, and
unemployment, may vary.102
Fourth, the disclosures are non-standardized in their methods of
grouping the financial performance data of their units.  Approximately
14.44% of disclosures group the performance data by the units’ location-
type, such as mall, train station, gas station or airport.  Further, 8.89% of
disclosures group the performance information by the units’ geographical
region, such as Mid-Atlantic, Northeast and Southeast.  In addition, 4.44%
of disclosures group the performance data by the units’ size, as reflected
in the unit’s square feet or number of seats.  Moreover, 11.11% of disclo-
sures group the performance facts by the type of unit, such as kiosk, drive
thru, free standing and express.  Additionally 3.33% of disclosures group
the data by the units’ age.  Other disclosures either use a different group-
ing method or do not group the data at all.
Fifth, the disclosures are not standardized regarding the statistical
data that they provide about the units’ financial performance.  Approxi-
mately 86.67% of disclosures provide data about the number or percent-
age of units that exceeded the average unit’s financial performance.
Further, 15.56% of disclosures divide the units’ performance data by quar-
tiles.  Among these latter disclosures, 21.43% exclude the bottom quartile
100. See, e.g., Franchise Disclosure Document of Carl’s Jr. Restaurants 55,
https://www.wdfi.org/apps/FranchiseSearch/details.aspx?id=613637&hash=6460
49066&search=external&type=GENERAL [https://perma.cc/Z9F2-DDVC] (last
visited Jan. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Carl’s Jr. FDD] (available under “Download”)
(Jan. 31); Dunkin’ Donuts FDD, supra note 98, at 96 (Oct. 25); Franchise Disclo-
sure Document of Jack in the Box, at 50 (on file with Villanova Law Review) [here-
inafter Jack in the Box FDD); Krispy Kreme FDD, supra note 99, at 55 (Feb. 1);
Franchise Disclosure Document of Sonic Drive-Ins 34, https://www.wdfi.org/
apps/FranchiseSearch/details.aspx?id=614343&hash=470458038&search=external
&type=GENERAL [https://perma.cc/H4XM-SCG5] (last visited Jan. 15, 2017)
(available under “Download”) (Aug. 31).
101. See Luke Arthur, What Are the Limitations of a Company’s Financial State-
ments?, CHRON, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/limitations-companys-financial-
statements-23764.html [https://perma.cc/HHW6-9RAU] (last visited Jan. 15,
2017) (“If the fiscal year is ending at a different time for two companies, it is tough
to make an accurate comparison of those businesses.”).
102. Cf. ROSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 76 (9th ed. 2010)
(“[D]ifferent firms end their fiscal years at different times. For firms in seasonal
businesses . . . this can lead to difficulties in comparing balance sheets because of
fluctuations in accounts during the year.”); see also Fiscal Year-End, INVESTING-
ANSWERS, http://www.investinganswers.com/financial-dictionary/businesses-cor
porations/fiscal-year-end-5772 [https://perma.cc/QS5T-M3NU] (last visited Jan.
15, 2017).
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from their data.  In addition, 18.89% of disclosures number franchises by
sales class.  These disclosures also vary amongst themselves and include
different number of classes ranging from two to fourteen.103  Further-
more, 30% of disclosures include longitudinal performance data spanning
more than one year, which can assist potential franchisees in identifying
performance trends.  These disclosures also vary and include different
numbers of years, ranging from three to twenty.104
103. See, e.g., Franchise Disclosure Document of Auntie Anne’s 69, https://
www.wdfi.org/apps/FranchiseSearch/details.aspx?id=612918&hash=873676359&
search=external&type=GENERAL [https://perma.cc/7LQR-KHSP] (last visited
Jan. 15, 2017) (available under “Download”) (five classes); Franchise Disclosure
Document of Culver’s Franchising System 36, https://www.wdfi.org/apps/Fran
chiseSearch/details.aspx?id=612937&hash=1221815067&search=external&type=
GENERAL [https://perma.cc/F9C6-2J99] (last visited Jan. 15, 2017) (available
under “Download”) (fourteen classes); Franchise Disclosure Document of Haagen-
Dazs Shoppe Company 55, https://www.wdfi.org/apps/FranchiseSearch/de
tails.aspx?id=612821&hash=1415579177&search=external&type=GENERAL [https:
//perma.cc/43L2-WGLF] (last visited Jan. 15, 2017) (available under “Down-
load”) (ten classes); Franchise Disclosure Document of Marcos Franchising 85,
https://www.cards.commerce.state.mn.us/CARDS/security/search.do?method
=ShowPoup&documentId={4DEF442A-8A86-4D81-8691-5DC23F16CB86}&docu
mentTitle=1630-201604-02&documentType=4 [https://perma.cc/3DWJ-4V7G]
[hereinafter Marcos Franchising FDD] (seven classes); Franchise Disclosure Docu-
ment of Pinkberry 46, https://www.wdfi.org/apps/FranchiseSearch/details.aspx
?id=613808&hash=1956197054&search=external&type=GENERAL [https://
perma.cc/QKL5-8PJA] (last visited Jan. 15, 2017) (available under “Download”)
(four classes); Franchise Disclosure Document of Pizza Hut 55–57, https://
www.wdfi.org/apps/FranchiseSearch/details.aspx?id=613648&hash=663348508&
search=external&type=GENERAL [https://perma.cc/MD56-QW9T] (last visited
Jan. 15, 2017) (available under “Download”) (three classes); Franchise Disclosure
Document of Smoothie King 49, https://www.wdfi.org/apps/FranchiseSearch/de
tails.aspx?id=613438&hash=1144336217&search=external&type=GENERAL
[https://perma.cc/H5U3-B6BD] (last visited Jan. 15, 2017) (available under
“Download”) (two classes); Franchise Disclosure Document of Yogurtland
Franchising 51, https://docqnet.dbo.ca.gov/search/SharepointDocuments/ (last
visited Jan. 15, 2017) (available under “Franchise Disclosure Document”) (six
classes).
104. See, e.g., Carl’s Jr. FDD, supra note 100, at 57 (fifteen years); Franchise
Disclosure Document of Happy Joe’s 37, https://www.wdfi.org/apps/Franchise
Search/details.aspx?id=612527&hash=888270444&search=external&type=GENER
AL [https://perma.cc/LXA2-GWY5] (last visited Jan. 15, 2017) (available under
“Download”) (three years); Franchise Disclosure Document of Hurricane AMT 47,
https://www.wdfi.org/apps/FranchiseSearch/details.aspx?id=613564&hash=9108
54518&search=external&type=GENERAL [https://perma.cc/ZK2J-VJFY] (last vis-
ited Jan. 15, 2017) (available under “Download”) (six years); Marcos Franchising
FDD, supra note 103, at 87 (five years); Franchise Disclosure Document of Pizza
Ranch 45, https://www.wdfi.org/apps/FranchiseSearch/details.aspx?id=612983&
hash=885370219&search=external&type=GENERAL [https://perma.cc/NNG4-
ZWPH] (last visited Jan. 15, 2017) (available under “Download”) (twenty years);
Franchise Disclosure Document of Zaxby’s Franchising 43, https://www.wdfi.org/
apps/FranchiseSearch/details.aspx?id=613471&hash=706991666&search=external
&type=GENERAL [https://perma.cc/NB85-S2DE] (last visited Jan. 15, 2017)
(available under “Download”) (seven years).
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IV. DISCUSSION AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
A major goal of the Franchise Rule, as stated by the FTC, is to ensure
that franchise disclosure documents are standardized, thereby facilitating
comparison shopping among competing franchise offerings.105  At first
glance, the Rule seems to have achieved this goal, in that it requires each
disclosure document to be based on a uniform framework, which includes
a set of twenty-three specified items.106  However, a closer empirical exam-
ination of a central disclosure item, related to the franchisor’s financial
performance, reveals that the substantive content of the disclosures, as op-
posed to their general framework, is far from standardized.107
One possible explanation for this lack of standardization derives from
the wording of the Franchise Rule.  According to the FTC, because differ-
ent industries—such as the quick service restaurant industry and the lodg-
ing industry—are governed by the same Franchise Rule, the Rule’s
language should not mandate a particular set of financial performance
disclosures.108  Accordingly, even franchisors within the same industry, such
as those within the quick service restaurant industry, are governed by in-
decisive disclosure rules, which, in turn, undermine the Franchise Rule’s
ultimate goal of standardization in a number of ways.  First, the Franchise
Rule “permits” quick service restaurant franchisors to provide a financial
105. See supra Part II.A.
106. See supra Part II.A; see also James R. Cataland, Disclosure Protection:
Franchises and Food Court Leases, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 605, 615 (2006) (“The disclo-
sure document provides a means for the prospective franchisee to comparison
shop among [ ] thousands of franchises . . . .”); Peter Macrae Dillon, The Case for
the Use of Wrap-Around Disclosure Documents in Canada, 24 FRANCHISE L.J. 73, 73
(2004) (“Its consistency of form permits users—both prospective franchisees and
lawyers—to compare one disclosure document against another.”); Byron E. Fox &
Henry C. Su, Franchise Regulation—Solutions in Search of Problems?, 20 OKLA. CITY U.
L. REV. 241, 278 (1995) (“[D]isclosure regulation serves to prescribe a uniform
disclosure format that facilitates an item-by-item comparison of franchise
systems . . . .”).
107. See supra Part III.D.
108. See Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising
and Business Opportunities, 72 Fed. Reg. 15,444, 15,498 (Mar. 30, 2007) (“Given
that many different industries are affected by part 436, what makes a financial
performance disclosure reasonable, complete, and accurate is quite varied.  Thus,
the Commission will not mandate a particular set of financial performance disclo-
sures.”); see also Dale Cantone, Md. Att’y Gen. Office, et al., Walking the FPR Tight-
rope: Managing the Expectations of Prospective Franchisees, Lenders and
Regulators in Preparing Financial Performance Representations, Presentation at
the International Franchise Association’s 48th Annual Legal Symposium 1 (May
2015) (“[D]isclosure of FPRs remains optional and unstructured . . . .  [T]here still
is relatively little guidance on how to prepare FPRs and what information to in-
clude.”); Stuart Hershman, DLA Piper, LLP, et al., Advanced FPRs: Writing, Using,
Attacking and Defending Financial Performance Representations, Presentation at
the International Franchise Association’s 46th Annual Legal Symposium 3 (May
2013) (“There are no set rules for the type of information that a franchisor may
include in an FPR or the manner in which the franchisor presents that informa-
tion within Item 19.”).
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performance disclosure only under Item 19.109  Consequently, while the
majority of franchisors provide financial performance disclosures, some
franchisors do not.110  Second, the Franchise Rule’s definition of a finan-
cial performance disclosure is extremely flexible: A statement about the
“sales, income, gross profits, or net profits.”111  Accordingly, some quick
service restaurant disclosures include some data about the franchise sales
and costs, while other disclosures include data only about the franchise
sales.112  Third, the Franchise Rule allows quick service franchisors to pro-
vide information about the “financial performance of its franchised and/or
franchisor-owned outlets.”113  Hence, some disclosures include distin-
guished data about the financial performance of franchisee-owned units,
while other disclosures fail to distinguish between the financial perform-
ance data of franchisee-owned units and franchisor-owned units, or pro-
vide data about only franchisor-owned units.114  Fourth, the Franchise
Rule does not specify what must be the standardized characteristics of the
units that comprise the financial disclosures of a quick service
franchisor.115  The Rule thus allows each franchisor to choose the units’
characteristics freely, including, for example, their geographic location
(e.g., U.S. State) or type of location (e.g., airport or mall).116  Unsurpris-
ingly, the characteristics of the units that are included and excluded from
the disclosure documents vary significantly.117  Fifth, the Franchise Rule
does not specify if and how disclosures in the quick service industry must
group the units’ financial performance data (e.g., by geographic location,
unit type, or size).118  Thus, disclosures significantly differ in their group-
ing method.119  Sixth, the Franchise Rule does not specify which statistical
data quick service franchisors must present in their disclosure document,
beyond the “number and percent” of units “that actually attained or sur-
passed the stated [financial] results.”120  Accordingly, disclosures differ in
the statistical data that they provide regarding the restaurants’ financial
performance (e.g., quartiles breakdown or sales breakdown).121
In order to achieve the FTC’s central goal of standardization,122 the
language of the Franchise Rule, relating to each central industry, must be
decisive.  Particularly, the dominant quick service restaurant industry
109. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(s)(1) (2016).
110. See supra Part III.D.
111. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(e) (emphasis added).
112. See supra Part III.D.
113. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(s)(1).
114. See supra Part III.D.
115. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(s)(3)(ii)(A).
116. See id. § 436.5(s)(3)(ii)(A).
117. See supra Part III.D.
118. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(s).
119. See supra Part III.D.
120. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(s)(3)(ii)(E).
121. See supra Part III.D.
122. See supra Part II.
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should be governed by a set of conclusive and standardized rules that pro-
mote uniformity among financial performance disclosures within this im-
portant industry.123  Similarly, other major franchise industries, including
business services,124 personal services,125 and lodging,126 should be gov-
erned by particular sets of decisive disclosure rules, which promote stand-
ardization in each of these major industries.
In addition to the standardization of financial performance disclo-
sures, the wording of the Franchise Rule demonstrates that the Rule
should seek to promote another important goal: to allow potential fran-
chisees to weigh the expected costs and benefits of a franchise offered to
them effectively.127  For example, Item 19 should require each franchisor
to disclose information not only about potential sales of the franchise
units, as some franchisors do, but also about the costs of these units.128
Likewise, the Franchise Rule should prohibit franchisors to mix, in their
disclosures, data about the financial performance of franchisee-owned
units and franchisor-owned units.  Such mixture risks blurring the poten-
tial costs and benefits of the unit offered to the potential franchisee.129
Importantly, while this Article has empirically shown that the central
disclosure item, Item 19, is non-standardized, other items regulated by the
Franchise Rule likely suffer from the same deficiency due to the Franchise
Rule’s indecisive language regarding other disclosure items.  For example,
under Item 3, each franchisor is required to disclose whether it was a party
to any “material civil action involving the franchise relationship.”130  How-
ever, the Franchise Rule does not define the term “material.”131  Conse-
quently, different franchisors might interpret the materiality requirement
differently.132  As a result, the substantive content of Item 3 in each
franchise disclosure may vary, thereby undermining the Franchise Rule’s
goal of standardization.
123. See supra Part II.
124. The business services industry is the second-largest contributor to the
value output in the franchise industry, following the quick service restaurant indus-
try, with 19% of the total. See Outlook for 2015, supra note 9, at 21.
125. The personal services industry is the third largest contributor to the
value output in the franchise industry, with 11% of the total. See id.  It includes
services such as health care and entertainment. See id. at 13.
126. The lodging industry is the fourth largest contributor to the value output
in the franchise industry, with ten percent of the total. See id. at 21.
127. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 436.2(a), 436.5; Franchise Rule, supra note 15.
128. For empirical data about disclosures that include sales or costs, see supra
Part III.D.
129. For the differences between the financial performance of franchisee and
franchisor-owned units, see supra Part III.D.
130. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(c)(1)(ii) (emphasis added).
131. See id. § 436.1 (omitting definition of word “material”).
132. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Disclosure of Franchise Disputes, 19 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 281, 288 (2014) (citing Edward Wood Dunham & David Geronemus,
Lessons from the Resolution of Franchise Disputes, JAMS DISP. RESOL. ALERT, Summer
2003, at 1, 2).
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Likewise, according to the Franchise Rule’s wording, franchisors are
required, under Item 7, to “disclose the franchisee’s estimated initial in-
vestment” and “may include additional expenditure tables to show expen-
diture variations caused by differences such as in site location and
premises size.”133  As a result of this wording, some disclosures may in-
clude additional expenditure tables, while others may not include this in-
formation.  Standardization, again, is unlikely to be achieved.
Similarly, Item 10 of the Franchise Rule requires each franchisor to
“[d]isclose the terms of each financing arrangement, including leases and
installment contracts, that the franchisor . . . offer[s] . . . to the fran-
chisee.”134  In addition, the Rule states that “[t]he franchisor may summa-
rize the terms of each financing arrangement in tabular form, using
footnotes to provide additional information.”135  As such, it is possible that
only some franchisors may summarize the terms of each financing ar-
rangement in accordance with the Rule.  Here, too, standardization is un-
likely to occur.
V. CONCLUSION
An important goal of the federal government, as reflected by disclo-
sure laws and the smart disclosure policy, is to ensure that disclosure
documents, in each regulated industry, are standardized.136  Through
standardization, the government aims to allow disclosees to conduct effec-
tive comparison shopping between competing disclosers.137  Effective
comparison shopping, in turn, has the potential to increase competition
among disclosers hoping to attract well-informed disclosees.138
At first glance, federal disclosure laws, including the Franchise Rule,
appear to achieve the standardization goal in that they require each disclo-
sure document to be based on a uniform framework that consists of a set
of specified items.139  However, a deeper examination of disclosures tells a
different story.  As the empirical results of this case study show, the finan-
cial performance disclosures in the quick service restaurant franchise in-
dustry are far from being standardized.140  One central reason for this lack
of standardization is that the wording of the Franchise Rule is highly in-
decisive.141  In order to promote the standardization goal, the language of
the Franchise Rule must be much more conclusive and uniform.142
133. 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(g) (emphasis added).
134. See id. § 436.5(j)(1).
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. See supra Part II.
137. See supra Part I.
138. See supra Part I.
139. See supra Part II.
140. See supra Part III.D.
141. See supra Part IV.
142. See id.
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While this Article focuses on quick service restaurant franchise disclo-
sures regulated by the Franchise Rule, its normative conclusions have
broader implications.  All federal disclosure laws that aim to ensure indus-
try standardization and meaningful comparison shopping must be drafted
in decisive and uniform language.143  In order to achieve standardization,
it is insufficient for disclosure laws to prescribe a uniform general framework,
which includes a set of a specified number of items.  It is essential that
disclosure laws ensure that the substantive content of each disclosure item is
standardized.  Otherwise, as this empirical case study revealed, actual, sub-
stantive standardization is unlikely to occur.
143. For major examples of federal disclosure laws that aim to promote stand-
ardization, see supra Part II.
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APPENDIX I: FRANCHISES STUDIED
Auntie Anne’s Hand- Fresh Healthy Cafe´ Pizza Ranch
Rolled Soft Pretzels
Baskin-Robbins Fuzzy’s Taco Shop Pizza Schmizza
Ben & Jerry s Gigi’s Cupcakes Pretzelmaker
Biggby Coffee Great American Cookies Qdoba Mexican Grill
Billy Sims BBQ Great Harvest Ritas Italian Ice
Franchising
Blimpie Subs & Salads Great Wraps Robeks Fresh Juices &
Smoothies
Bojangles’ Restaurants Happy Joe’s Rosati’s Pizza
Breadsmith Hardee’s Samurai Sam’s Teriyaki
Grill
Buffalo Wild Wings House of Bread Smoothie Factory
Capriotti’s Sandwich Hungry Howie’s Pizza & Smoothie King
Shop Subs
Captain D’s Hurricane Grill & Wings Sonic Drive-In
Restaurants
Captain Tony’s Pizza & Jack in the Box Steak Escape Sandwich
Pasta Emporium Grill
Carl’s Jr. Restaurants Jersey Mike’s Subs Subway
Carvel Jet’s Pizza Surf City Squeeze
Charleys Philly Steaks Jimmy John’s Gourmet Taco Bell
Sandwiches
Checkers and Rally’s KFC TacoTime
Restaurants
Chesters Kolache Factory TCBY and Mrs. Fields
Chronic Tacos Kona Ice Teriyaki Madness
Enterprises
Church’s Chicken Krispy Kreme Doughnut The Coffee Beanery
Cinnabon Marble Slab Creamery The Great Steak &
Potato
Cold Stone Creamery Marcos Franchising The Haagen-Dazs
Shoppe
Corner Bakery Cafe Maui Wowi Hawaiian The Original SoupMan
Coffees & Smoothies
Cousins Subs McAlisters Deli Togo’s Franchisor
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McDonald’s Toppers PizzaCulver Franchising
System
D.P. Dough Menchie’s Tropical Smoothie Cafe
Dairy Queen Treat Moe’s Southwest Grill Villa Pizza
Franchise
Del Taco Nathan’s Famous Wayback Burgers
Deli Delicious Nestle Toll House Cafe Wetzel’s Pretzels
Franchising by Chip
Dippin’ Dots Nrgize Lifestyle Cafe Which Wich Superior
Franchising Sandwiches
Donatos Pizza Orange Leaf Frozen Wingstop Restaurants
Yogurt
Dunkin’ Donuts Orion Food Systems Yogurtland Franchising
(Hot Stuff Pizza)
Dunn Bros Coffee Papa John’s Your Pie
International
Elevation Burger Papa Murphys Z Pizza
Erbert & Gerbert’s Penn Station East Coast Zaxby’s Franchising
Sandwich Shops Subs
Figaro’s Pizza Pinkberry Ventures Zoup! Systems
Firehouse Subs Pita Pit
Freddy’s Frozen Custard Pizza Hut
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